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Abstract 
This paper reviews the complex, overlapping ideas of two prominent Italian 
philosophers, Lorenzo Magnani and Luciano Floridi, with the aim of facilitating 
the nonviolent transformation of self and world, and with a focus on information 
technologies in mediating this process. In Floridi’s information ethics, problems 
of consistency arise between self-poiesis, anagnorisis, entropy, evil, and the 
narrative structure of the world. Solutions come from Magnani’s work in 
distributed morality, moral mediators, moral bubbles and moral disengagement. 
Finally, two examples of information technology, one ancient and one new, a 
Socratic narrative and an information processing model of moral cognition, are 
offered as mediators for the nonviolent transformation of self and world 
respectively, while avoiding the tragic requirements inherent in Floridi’s proposal. 
KEYWORDS: moral mediator, information ethics, Magnani, Floridi, 
nonviolence, distributed morality 
1. Self, Poetry, and Information 
Without adequate reasoning, even well-intentioned moral actions may fail – or, 
worse still, cause harm – and the best way to facilitate adequate reasoning is to 
confront problems with flexible and well-fed minds 
     - Lorenzo Magnani1 
 
Luciano Floridi has “defended a view of the world as the totality of informational structures 
dynamically interacting with each other”, in which the world as information ecosystem, the 
“infosphere”, and all individual inhabitants are essentially interconnected “informational 
entities” with any given thing’s “least intrinsic value” “identified with its ontological status as an 
information object” as determined by an “analysis of being in terms of a minimal common 
ontology, whereby human beings as well as animals, plants, artifacts and so forth are interpreted 
as informational entities” (Floridi, 2011b, page 564, 2002, page 287, 2006, page 33), “To be is to 
be an informational entity” (Floridi, 2008, page 199). On Floridi’s picture, living things are also 
informational entities, “inforgs”, informational organisms, with human beings nestled amongst 
them as “interconnected informational organisms among other informational organisms and 
agents, sharing an informational environment”,2 and with that informational environment 
characterized by its degree of entropy (Floridi, 2011a, 2010, 2006). Entropy is important to 
Floridi’s information ethics as it is central both to the role of human beings in the informational 
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environment, and to the problem of evil, understood as increasing entropy (Floridi, 2006, 2002, 
1999). 
 Floridi understands human beings as homines poietici - selves whose defining capacity is 
to create order, from which derives the relationship between entropy and evil, for example the 
identification of evil with the destruction of order (i.e. violence), and with each self emerging “as 
a break with nature, not as a super connection with it” (Floridi, 2006, 2011b, page 560). 
Moreover, homo poieticus is unique in her/his reflexive awareness of this distinctive status, as an 
island of order within a sea of disorder, and with this recognition he/she is able to identify similar 
entities: 
Selves are the ultimate negentropic technologies, through which information 
temporarily overcomes its own entropy, becomes conscious, and is finally able to 
recount the story of its own emergence in terms of a progressive detachment from 
external reality. There are still only informational structures. But some are things, 
some are organisms, and some are minds, intelligent and self-aware beings. Only 
minds are able to interpret other informational structures as things or organisms or 
selves. And this is part of their special position in the universe (Floridi, 2011b, 
pages 564-5). 
The “progressive detachment from external reality” is a process undertaken by minds, human 
beings, as they understand their place amongst other informational entities, a process aided and 
accelerated by information communication technologies (ICTs). Floridi holds that ICTs are 
making possible a “fourth revolution” in human self-understanding, following Copernicus, 
Darwin, and Freud.  Note both that these first three plot an inward trend, from humans 
understanding their place amongst the stars, to their position within evolutionary time on Earth, 
to their selves as products of physical and metaphysical relationships, and that this fourth 
revolution follows this trend, as ICTs aid humans not only in understanding themselves, but in 
actively designing and constructing them. Floridi writes that: 
ICTs are, among other things, egopoietic technologies or technologies of self 
construction, significantly affecting who we are, who we think we are, who we 
might become, and who we think we might become (Floridi, 2011b, page 550). 
As part of their “special position in the universe” (note: not some limited domain therein), 
detached from reality and from this perspective, through technology, increasingly empowered to 
both study and shape it, humans have a “vocation for responsible stewardship in the world” 
(Floridi, 2006, p. 34). 
The more powerful homo poieticus becomes as an agent, the greater his duties and 
responsibilities become, as a moral agent, to oversee not only the development of 
his own character and habits but also the well-being and flourishing of each of his 
ever expanding spheres of influence, to include the whole infosphere (Floridi, 
2006, page 32). 
Accordingly, Floridi stresses not only the egopoietic, self-constructing potential afforded by 
ICTs, but also the world transforming, ecopoietic potential, where “The term “ecopoiesis” refers 
to the morally-informed construction of the environment, based on an ecologically-oriented 
perspective.” (Floridi, 2006, page 31) 
On this basis, Floridi extends a principled ethics resting on entropy “meant to be a 
macroethics for creators not just users of their surrounding ‘nature’ ”, in which, “fighting 
information entropy is the general moral law to be followed, not an impossible and ridiculous 
struggle against thermodynamics” (Floridi, 2006, pp. 33, 2002, p. 300): 
The duty of any moral agent should be evaluated in terms of contribution to the 
sustainable blooming of the infosphere, and any process, action or event that 
negatively affects the whole infosphere – not just an informational object – should 
be seen as an increase in its level of entropy and hence an instance of evil (Floridi, 
2006, p. 32). 
But, how are we to understand “entropy” and “evil” consistently throughout our “ever expanding 
spheres of influence”, including the “whole infosphere”, so that we might not only become 
responsible stewards of the world but also become morally “good” human beings? 
 First, we may wonder how we come to know ourselves as distinct selves in the first place. 
Floridi volunteers “what may be a fruitful approach to start understanding the construction of 
personal identities” centered on three terms: “egology”, the development of selves, proceeding 
first by individualization and then by (self-)identification, “self-poiesis”,  self-creation in the 
first-person through progressive detachment from the world (the not-self), punctuated by 
“anagnorisis”, the tragic realization that one’s self is not the self (the not-not-self) one thought 
one’s self to be: 
In Aristotle, the phenomenon of anagnorisis refers to the protagonist’s sudden 
recognition, discovery, or realization of his or her own or another character’s true 
identity or nature. Through anagnorisis, previously unforeseen character 
information is revealed. Classic narratives in which anagnorisis plays a crucial 
role include Oedipus Rex and MacBeth. More recently one may mention The Sixth 
Sense, The Others, or Shutter Island. I shall not spoil the last three, if the reader 
has not watched them. Generalizing, one may say that, given an information flow, 
anagnorisis is the information process (epistemic change) through which a later 
stage in the information flow (the acquisition of new information) forces the 
correct reinterpretation of the whole information flow (all information previously 
and subsequently received). For this reason, I prefer to translate anagnorisis as 
realization (Floridi, 2011b, p. 564). 
On this assay, one’s self is most completely realized when the self one thought one was is 
discovered to not, in fact, be the self whom one is, compelling “the correct reinterpretation of the 
whole information flow.” Moreover, this process occurs within narrative structures of our own 
creation, “through which we semanticize reality, i.e., through which we make sense of our 
environment, of ourselves in it, and of our interactions with and within it” (Floridi, 2011b, p. 
564).  
 Notably, anagnorisis is not a stand-alone notion. In Aristotle’s Poetics, his analysis is 
essentially tied with that of hamartia, a tragic error in judgment, from which disaster results 
(Aristotle, 1995, Poetics, books 13 and 14). Hamartia is not a character flaw, but flawed 
judgment due to emotion over-riding incomplete information. An agent acts toward an end, 
misses, and effects the opposite of those intentions, falling to tragic irony, realizing himself in 
terms not only opposite, but inverted, to those presupposed, and is thus presented the option to 
reconcile the difference, transcending prior limitations, becoming wiser, or close to it, only 
thereby expressing a flawed character, vicious ignorance (White, 2006).3 So clarified, it is only 
to the original point of error, hamartia, that the information flow is re-cast, not the “entire” 
information flow as Floridi speculates. For example, the Occupy movement in the USA generally 
calls for repeal of the Federal Reserve act of 1913, to the point where the people feel a tragic 
error had been made, and not for the revision of all of Western history.4 Moreover, this 
illustration of hamartia in historical narrative reveals a rather disturbing fact about the “entire 
information flow” – we create it on the fly. Often enough where we end up is the product of a 
mistake, and often enough due to inadequate information. Finally, it is what we do at this point, 
fully informed of possibilities otherwise, that determines our characters, good or evil. 
  Two problems must be addressed. First, entropy. Entropy in information theory does not 
exactly match that of the physical sciences, with the former understanding entropy as the 
probability of the presentation of a message, and with the latter understanding entropy as a direct 
measure of disorder relative potential energy. Floridi is a “nonreductionist”, supposing 
information of different forms to be qualified by exclusive accounts and measured by specific 
means, thereby admitting multiple sorts of entropy (Floridi, 2004). This position, however, 
stands against his “view of the world as the totality of informational structures dynamically 
interacting with each other”, a position demonstrated by his own direct application of the 
“entropy method” from the artificial to the “standard domain” in assessing the moral significance 
of a broken windscreen (Floridi, 1999). One cannot have things both ways – either the world is 
coextensive with the domain of information, as implied when information counts as the 
fundamental ontological dimension, or information is a sub-domain of the world, as is implied 
when informational entropy is otherwise than natural entropy. We shall realize an informational 
view of self and world grounded on a single form in the next section. 
 Second, the problem of value. Raphael Capurro counters Floridi, holding that all value 
derives from human evaluation, as there is a human being – a “mind” - at the center of any claim 
to moral significance. Leveling the field of being on the basis of a common information 
ontology, while at once disengaging from the natural world that governs human being, creates a 
conceptual environment that dislocates the source of valuation from selves to some realm of 
ideals, “out there”, diminishing both the human role in the production of value through work and 
its social value assessed through empathic mirroring of similarly embodied conditions, thereby 
inviting a slippery slope whereby things become more valuable than the human beings who 
engage with them (Capurro, 2008). This is problematic, recalling Plato, because as things gain 
value over people, we move from a healthy world to one with a “fever”. Indeed, as recent 
Occupy movements around the world demonstrate, it seems that we already live in such a world, 
illuminating two important issues. One, as asserted on OccupyWallSt.org, the movement 
depends on ICTs to coordinate actions, by the so-called “Arab Spring tactic to achieve our ends 
and encourage the use of nonviolence to maximize the safety of all participants.” This fact 
cements the moral significance of information. And, following Capurro, it also affirms that this 
value derives from human beings using information to construct a just social order. Two, there is 
no doubt that anagnorisis results in self-realization, for better or for worse. However, it is this 
potential for ending up worse that questions its fruitfulness as a strategy for advancing self-
understanding. Certainly, at tragic ends already, it is a useful model for moral reasoning, but the 
people behind OccupyWallSt.org would certainly rather that the Federal Reserve Act had failed 
in the first place, just as Oedipus may have benefitted by DNA testing. 
 This is indeed a critical period in human development, even a “fourth revolution” of self-
understanding catalyzed by information technologies and serving the potential construction of 
healthy selves and world. But, we must proceed with caution, else invite further tragedy. In this 
spirit, consider Lorenzo Magnani: 
While I deeply believe that creating and acquiring new knowledge is critically 
important, even I must admit that all the information in the world is meaningless 
unless we can use it effectively: the principles and ways of reasoning that allow us 
to put new ethical knowledge to work are just as important as the knowledge itself 
(Magnani, 2007, p. 162). 
It is not enough to recognize that all things are potential sources of information, to commit to 
promote “the flourishing of informational entities as well as of the whole infosphere” by limiting 
entropy within it. “Coherence in moral behavior is not necessarily good in itself” (Magnani, 
2007, p. 145). And, order for the sake of order is not necessarily good in itself, either, as 
OccupyWallStreeters stand in testament. At least until the moral significance of entropy is 
clarified, commitments to avoid it are nothing we can “put to work”. 
 We must conceptually transform Floridi’s infosphere into the “ethosphere”. But, with due 
caution, how should we proceed? To complete this task will require two things. For one, as it is 
inevitably some self, or selves, responsible for hamartia, piloting this transformation sans 
tragedy requires first of all a conception of self up to the task, “a conception of self that may be 
more easily shared (though of course, pluralistically) among the larger globe” (Ess, 2008, p. 
167). An informationally modeled self is indeed easily shared, bereft as it is of culturally specific 
baggage, and so indeed the fourth revolution in self-understanding is well-presented as an 
informational one. Additionally, we require the tools and methods necessary to effect the 
transformation of the world of informational objects into one of moral value, infosphere to 
ethosphere.  According to Charles Ess, 
[…] we are in need of developing notions of distributed responsibility in an ethics 
of distributed morality - i.e., notions better suited to our realities as informational 
agents and patients, who are inextricably interwoven with one another via 
computer and other networks (Ess, 2008, p. 161). 
2. Magnani, Mediation, and Method  
In one word, science (critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the 
narrow gate that leads to the true doctrine of practical wisdom, if we understand 
by this not merely what one ought to do, but what ought to serve teachers as a 
guide to construct well and clearly the road to wisdom which everyone should 
travel, and to secure others from going astray. 
      - Immanuel Kant5 
 
 Lorenzo Magnani has written systematically on the role of abduction both in “scientific 
and everyday reasoning”, “typical reasoning in presence of incomplete information”, understood 
from Peirce as “inference that involves the generation and evaluation of explanatory hypotheses” 
and “inferring certain facts and/or laws and hypotheses that render some sentences plausible”, 
present even in simple instances of visual perception, and the form of reasoning most applicable 
to moral problems (Magnani, 2011, p. 61, Magnani and Nersessian, 2002, p. 306, Magnani, 
2005). One Peircean illustration of this form of reasoning is offered in the distinction between 
two types of cloth by comparing the sensations of their textures, “but not immediately”, requiring 
one “to move fingers over the cloth”. (Magnani, 2007, p. 185). This is an example of 
“manipulative abduction”, “thinking through doing” which, from evolutionary and 
developmental psychological perspectives eventuates in increasingly sophisticated sentential and 
symbolic reasoning through a process that Magnani designates the “disembodiment of mind” 
(Magnani, 2009). 
 Epistemically, by this process, the space of action is patterned in “construals” - 
effectively embodied and situated knowledge how. As these construals stabilize through 
repetition, they begin to pre-figure experience and rise to explicit awareness. Formalized, they 
become “parts of a memory system that crosses the boundary between person and environment”, 
forming the basis of ritual, conventional law, guiding religious narratives, and theories – such as 
information ethics - with predictive force and moral value, all “disembodied” aspects of 
distributed cognition (Magnani, 2007, p. 242 and p. 232). Accordingly, Magnani’s work has also 
focused on “model-based reasoning”, indicating “the construction and manipulation of various 
kinds of representations, not mainly sentential and/or formal, but mental and/or related to 
external mediators”, following Peirce in understanding that all thought, “being minds”, is 
mediated by “signs” - phenomena “available to interpretation” guide our actions “in a positive or 
negative way” and “become signs when we think and interpret them”, including feelings, e.g. 
“somatic markers” (Magnani and Nersessian, 2002, p. 308, Magnani, 2009, p. 490, Damasio, 
1999). “Being a mind” means “to be absorbed in making, manifesting, or reacting to a series of 
signs” - recalling Floridi, “able to interpret other informational structures as things or organisms 
or selves” - while being also “an external sign” for self and others (Magnani, 2009, pp. 489-490). 
Most importantly, “the “person-sign’’ is a future-conditional”, “not fully formed in the present 
but depending on the future destiny of the concrete semiotic activity (future thoughts and 
experience of the community) in which s/he will be involved” (Magnani, 2009, p. 490). Thus, 
cognition is essentially evolved, developed, embodied, self-determining and distributed, 
“extended” through time and space, “consisting of the person plus the external physical 
representation” that facilitates and potentially changes the way that one reasons, as is the case 
with “epistemic mediators” like microscopes, telescopes, pen and paper, and information 
technology (Magnani and Nersessian, 2002, pp. 312-313). 
 Magnani locates morality in “all those situations in which humans have to manage 
problems related, for instance, to making decisions or policies that may have a moral concern 
and impact on our lives”, including “coming up with new ideas that can solve old problems and 
even create new moral concerns towards new moral entities, such as animals and things” 
(Magnani and Bardone, 2008, p. 104). This is ethics as a creative enterprise, “creating ethics” 
through moral reasoning, which can “be viewed as a form of “possible worlds” anticipation, a 
way of getting chances to shape the human world and act in it”, in this way “creating the world 
and its directions, in front of different (real or abstract) situations and problems” (Magnani and 
Bardone, 2008, p. 99). It “involves coming to see some aspects of reality in a particular way that 
influences human acting in shaping and surviving the future”, and through this process “many 
external things, usually inert from the moral point of view, can be transformed into what we 
describe as “moral mediators”, “moral tools” “distributed in ‘external’ objects and structures 
which function as ethical devices” (Magnani and Bardone, 2008, p. 100). Magnani takes 
inspiration from Edwin Hutchins’ “mediating structures”, emphasizing behavioral mediation, 
objects which direct, constrain, and guide action along culturally specific lines, contributing to 
cultural coherency, referring “to various external tools that can facilitate cognitive acts of 
navigating in both modern and ‘primitive’ settings” (Magnani, 2007, footnote, p. 237). 
Furthermore, in exhibiting “care” for and through these devices, we demonstrate for others a 
“conscientious” pattern exhibiting “a fundamental kind of moral inference and knowledge”, by 
which “even a lowly kitchen utensil can be considered a moral mediator” (Magnani, 2011, p. 
133). Thus, moral mediators range from objects to agents to actions to systems including binding 
narratives, through which we “make sense” of it all. 
 As a tool for “creative abduction”, making sense of self and world in light of incomplete 
information, a moral mediator is a special kind of representation. As “distributed morality”, it is a 
“task-transforming representation” able to “transform difficult tasks into ones that can be done 
by pattern matching” by performing what has been called “the “representational task” of 
representing moral problems so that their solutions are transparent” (Magnani and Bardone, 
2008, p. 103).  
Moral mediators represent a kind of redistribution of the moral effort through 
managing objects and information in such a way that we can overcome the 
poverty and the unsatisfactory character of the moral options immediately 
represented or found internally (for example principles, prototypes, etc.) 
(Magnani and Bardone, 2008, p. 105). 
By “pattern matching”, one quickly imagines metaphor; and, of course, metaphor has been 
recognized as central to cognition, being a capacity to recognize patterns of relationships 
amongst vastly different arrays of objects  (Pinker, 2007). Here, metaphor and “pattern 
matching” are best understood as a form of abduction, model-based reasoning, in which Magnani 
and Bardone capture “a considerable part of the thinking activity” (cf. also Magnani and 
Nersessian, 2002, Magnani 2005). 
 Perhaps the most ubiquitous pattern of thought is the simple “possible worlds” 
counterfactual, “If... then...” Magnani and Bardone provide a poignant example of this pattern in 
a most ubiquitous form of ICT, a website, CostofWar.com. CostofWar.com presents a running 
tally of the US dollar costs of wars continuously waged by the USA since 2001. As of October, 
2011, it shows a total monetary cost of all wars begun since 2001 (costs to the USA, begun by 
the USA) to be over 1.2 trillion, with the total cost of war (invasion and occupation) in Iraq to be 
over 800 billion. Alone, these are simply big numbers. They are not “immediately” morally 
significant, only becoming so when recast counterfactually as opportunities lost, for example 
“the number of children we could have insured, if...” Presenting alternative consequences, 
CostofWar.com “represents the same piece of information so that the problem we face, for 
instance, thinking about going to war or not, is completely changed”, and qualifies as a moral 
mediator “because it mediates the task changing the representation we have of it, and making the 
solution more transparent” (Magnani and Bardone, 2008, p. 105). Thusly, information becomes 
ethics, and we are on our way to transforming the infosphere into the ethosphere. 
 One product of Magnani’s work that can help to illuminate the most difficult aspects of 
this transformation is his notion of the “moral bubble”. Moral bubbles are “viscous” subdomains 
of the ethosphere that bind persons within sub-groups of humanity, and that “systematically 
disguise” the violence of their actions by making them unable to “incorporate”(empathize with) 
“the effect of [their] behavior on other human beings” or, in “bad faith” on themselves, while 
easing moral tensions by allowing them to “avoid the cognitive breakdown” “triggered by the 
constant appraisal” of every action inconsistent with given moral conviction (Magnani, 2011, pp. 
8, 59, and 77). Magnani models the “glue-like” integrity of moral bubbles on the disposition of 
agents within epistemic bubbles to “resolve the tension between their thinking that they know P 
and their knowing P in favor of knowing that P”, the difference being that, rather than 
“knowing” that something is true, “prisoners” of moral bubbles “know” that something is right, 
with this “knowledge” reinforced through gossip and narrative that “inform and disseminate the 
moral dominant knowledge of a group” (Magnani, 2011, p. 74, quoting John Woods, and p. 79). 
Thus, a moral bubble is a type of “cognitive niche” in which persons are actively insulated both 
from the anxiety associated with admitting that “we know a lot less than we think we do”, and 
from perceiving moral inconsistencies, feeling responsibility for their actions (Magnani, 2011, p. 
74). As domains of action expand, prisoners of bubbles conflict with prisoners of other bubbles 
and even those within the same bubbles “whenever one’s signaling does not conform with the 
‘standard’ implications meant by the signal deployed.” (Magnani, 2011, page 84) Even war is 
justified in a moral bubble as the “predominant view is that in a state of war, the act of killing is 
ruled by different moral principles from those that rule acts of killing in other contexts.” 
(Magnani, 2011, page 175) 
 “Embubblement” is facilitated through the violent use of the prototypical ICT, language, 
cutting humanity apart with some divided as means to others’ ends, “exactly like a knife […] of 
biological origin”, and as “the outward extension of an organic activity” (Magnani, 2011, p. 47). 
Violence is often justified, and the viscous integrity of the moral bubble maintained, through a 
“perverting of sympathy” tempering the cognitive dissonance arising when one “simultaneously 
holds two contrasting cognitions”, and rather than reconcile them ends up “obliterating facts 
supporting one view and fabricating appropriate evidence justifying that suppression in favor of 
the other” (Magnani, 2011, pp. 103-104). In this way, embubblement creates conflict, “structural 
violence”, that is “often diluted in the pervasive form of narratives”, including “the fairytales that 
are told to children from early youth”, as these inspire drives to champion the terms by which 
one thrives and strives for his/her own happy ending, thus presenting preservative actions as 
morally justified (Magnani, 2011, p. 123). Persons committed to the terms of such fairy tales 
pursue them with zeal, however violent, often “fabricating evidence” at the expense of others 
through deception, “bullshitting” (Magnani, 2011, p. 105). Magnani illustrates this fairy tale 
bullshit by way of recent “too big to fail” bank “bailouts” propagated on a “sacred myth” that at 
once, perversely, considers “government action of any sort beyond bare minimum” unnecessary 
while at once claiming that government financial support is necessary for the integrity of the 
“global” economic system, itself an over-inflated bubble, in a prime example of perverted 
sympathy “actively supported and encouraged not only by politicians, but also by intellectual 
elite” who leveraged expert testimony to undermine democracy and “dupe public opinion”, 
thereby serving one bubble at the expense everyone else (Magnani, 2011, p. 105). Thus, even 
employed in preservation of order, information is a tool of violence, resulting in tragic injustice, 
recalling OccupyWallStreet, entropy, and evil. 
 Magnani’s moral bubbles provide a model that helps to clarify the relationship between 
entropy and evil: 
It is well-known that, from the point of view of physics, organisms are far-from-
equilibrium systems relative to their physical or abiotic surroundings. Apparently 
they violate the second law of thermodynamics because they stay alive, the law 
stating that net entropy always increases and that complex and concentrated stores 
of energy necessarily break down (Magnani, 2011, p. 121). 
They apparently violate the second law because they construct local orders - bubbles, niches, 
narratives, theories, and so on – maintain these orders, and pattern them in terms of modes of 
engagement that, ostensibly, increase survivability in the natural world, i.e. knowledge: 
To create cognitive niches is a way that an organism (which is always smartly and 
plastically “active”, looking for profitable resources, and aiming at enhancing 
fitness) has to stay alive without violating the second law: indeed it “cannot” 
violate it (Magnani, 2011, p. 121). 
The second law is not violated because the niche is a local space of order created at entropic 
expense to whatever is other. This “entropic expense” translates into actions and attitudes 
ranging from violence to ignorance, in any case raising the level of energy necessary for systems 
external (logically, not necessarily physically) to the bubble in question to remain stable and 
retain integrity. Thus, increasing entropy in the “whole” infosphere, bubble-making is 
objectively “evil”. Meanwhile, being the space of information in terms of which people live and 
die, these orders are essentially moral, with their creation and maintenance perceived, selfishly, 
“good”.  
 Consider in this light Kantian moral theory, impelling persons to “Act so that the maxim 
of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation”, while 
“The direct opposite of the principle of morality is, when the principle of private happiness is 
made the determining principle of the will” (Kant, 1898, pp. 93 and 96). Putting these together, a 
principle of immorality emerges: “Act so that the maxim of thy will is private happiness.” The 
“propensity to evil” that this modified maxim represents is an inclination to “reverse the moral 
order” due to the weakness, impurity, and/or corruption of the heart, which for Kant is the seat of 
the “springs” of will, source of motivation, where the morally good agent acts solely by the 
spring of moral law, “alone an adequate spring”, and “Whatever is not done from this faith is 
sin”, while the bad agent acts selfishly by “deceiving itself as to its own good or bad 
dispositions” through “malignancy” that “extends itself then outwardly also to falsehood and 
deception of others which, if it is not to be called badness, at least deserves to be called 
worthlessness” (Kant, 1898, pp. 217-218, and 223). Worthless, “the moral agent falls into a 
perfidious moral bubble, where the evil is not perceived”, in what Magnani calls moral 
“disengagement” through which “The moral agent falls into a perfidious and self-deceitful 
reengagement in a new decisional framework where evil is simply supposed to be good, and so 
morally justified”6 (Magnani, 2011, p. 181). 
 In illustration, imagine a single, universal plane of moral order representing a low-energy 
stable state of maximal potential energy. Given the natural tendency toward disorder, further 
imagine the spontaneous disintegration of this universal moral domain into local regions, 
bubbles, that retain internal order at the accelerated disorder of whatever is external. 
Accordingly, “evil” is related with entropy as the tendency to exacerbate this disintegration, and 
“good” the tendency otherwise. However, recalling that organisms create bubbles as a way to 
“stay alive without violating the second law”, so think it “good”, subjective perceptions of “evil” 
differ from the preceding portrait. “Evil” is (subjectively) idealized as agents and actions “that 
intentionally harm other people thanks to a transgression of a moral rule perfectly present and 
approved in the agent’s mind”, while actual “evil-doers” are “embedded in their “moral 
bubbles”, understanding their actions “as totally or abundantly justified” with “evil” existing 
“only in the experience of the victim” (Magnani, 2011, p. 182). 
 Still, IF we want to become “good” persons, THEN by what method might we move in 
that direction? A demonstrated tendency to the good exists in non-violent movements for social 
change. Magnani writes that: 
[…] nonviolence always promotes what I can call a “moral epistemology”: new 
“regimes” of truth related to the “inessentiality of something, or its nothingness, 
in the form of illuminating its fragility and pursuing the orchestration of its 
collapse” (Magnani, 2011, p. 142).  
This description appears violent, and in the minds of the “victims” of non-violent movements for 
social justice, even “evil”. However, in this orchestrated collapse of the inessential the 
proliferation of bubbles is contravened. Through non-violence, people work – use metabolic 
energy – to increase universal moral order. Granted, they increase disorder in target moral 
bubbles – bubbles get popped - and granted that global disorder is always increasing per the 
second law, so they may appear engaged in a “ridiculous struggle against thermodynamics”. But, 
the resulting moral order, the ethosphere, is transformed otherwise. Consider Martin Luther 
King, Jr., on these points: 
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that 
a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the 
issue […]. Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create the tension in the 
mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to 
the unfettered realm of creative analyses and objective appraisal, so must we see 
the need for nonviolent gadflies to create a kind of tension in society that will help 
men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of 
understanding and brotherhood.7 
King’s method is to force embubbled persons to overcome their cognitive dissonance by 
forbidding them to continue “obliterating facts supporting one view and fabricating appropriate 
evidence justifying that suppression in favor of the other.” Thus, reducing the number of moral 
bubbles in the world, bringing people together, and increasing order. Tellingly, he points out this 
intention through an entropically significant physical metaphor - “majestic heights”. He points 
up. And up is a good thing. 
3. Technologically Mediated Moral Embubblement 
How we ought to live is the central problem of morality, and the way we reason 
dictates how we live. 
     - Lorenzo Magnani8 
 
Since King, however, we appear to have traveled in the other direction, with the “War on 
Terror”, as articulated in GW Bush’s infamous “doctrine” “Either you are with us, or you are 
with the terrorists”, delivered along with a supporting narrative justifying the occupation of 
Afghanistan due to its alleged involvement in the deaths of more than 3000 US citizens, “They 
hate us for our freedom.”9 This language split the world like a knife along an “Axis of Evil”, 
“rogue states” Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and later Syria, Libya, and Cuba.10 In Iraq alone, with 
“documented civilian deaths from violence” over 103,000,11 while “the deliberate destruction of 
Iraq’s water and sewage systems by US bombings has been the major cause (for a decade) of an 
outbreak of diarrhea and hepatitis, particularly lethal to pregnant women and young children”,12 
and with “defects in newborns 11x higher than normal” due to depleted uranium munitions,13 
poison with a half-life measured in the billions of years,14 Iraqis have suffered “irreversible 
injustice” due to “countless numbers of families, friends, refugees and orphans who have 
suffered losses” for which “the US and its allies are responsible”, while “the denial by the 
governments of the US and its allies over the number of excess Iraqi civilian casualties is further 
adding to this injustice” (Karagiozakis, 2009). With the critical reason for the invasion, alleged 
“weapons of mass destruction”, now acknowledged to have been founded on incomplete, faulty 
– if not bullshit - information,15 it is no mystery why so many are questioning “the whole 
information flow”.16 We are at a tragic end, due to tragic error, and so many continue to suffer 
for it. Who is the terrorist, now? Before we ever look up, again, we - as future conditionals - 
must reconcile with the fact that we have become the opposite of who we set out to become. 
 As difficult as this process may be on its own, it is made all the more difficult through the 
employment of ICTs in the reinforcement of embubbling paradigms through a process that 
Magnani terms “cognitive hacking”. This is nothing less than technologically mediated and 
targeted deception. Information, through technology, is deployed in a violent “semantic attack” 
targeting the technology users’ minds and behaviors “by manipulating their perception of 
reality”. 
In this case information is used in a violent and sophisticated way – beyond the 
well-known violent effects of traditional mass-media propaganda – to influence 
and to affect the behavior of humans through computational tools: a full process 
of information warfare, as it is called (Magnani, 2011, page 87) 
 
Killing and poisoning so many people on the basis of intentionally bad information raises the 
issue of the relative moral status of persons and things. Certainly, deceiving a population in order 
to serve one’s own selfish purposes is to treat those persons as a means to one’s own ends, as a 
thing and not as an end in itself, and so is, at least from a Kantian perspective, patently immoral. 
However, this still leaves the relative moral status of persons and things unspecified, and 
deserving of immediate attention. 
The distinction between persons and things is subtle, if not fuzzy, especially as we are 
embedded in a technological world, with technologies of all sorts increasingly mediating even 
the most mundane aspects of our lives. Lorenzo Magnani has argued that “advanced and more 
pervasive technology” has “blurred the line between humans and things” making it “increasingly 
difficult to discern where the human body ends and the non-human thing begins”, “so that we 
delegate action to external things (objects, tools, artifacts) that in turn share our human existence 
with us”, with this “hybridization” in turn necessitating “treating people as things”, however 
stating that “instead of treating people as means, we can improve their lives by recognizing their 
part-thingness and respecting them as things” (Magnani, 2007, preface, pp. x-xi). This position 
has created some controversy, to which Magnani has responded by clarifying that we must 
‘‘respect [not treat] people as things” “only when things are already endowed with an ethical 
value, and sometimes endowed with much more ethical worth than humans” (Magnani, 2010, p. 
162). 
Also, consider that children are often killed and violated just because of the needs 
of ‘‘things’’ to which we have attributed too much ethical value (capitalistic 
profit, for example, to use an old-fashioned socialist idea). So I answer: we have 
to respect people at least to the same degree that we respect some ‘‘sacred’’ 
things. For now we are very far from this target (Magnani, 2010, p. 163). 
Magnani simply holds that “human beings must be respected as we now respect many things; 
people deserve, at the very least, the same level of care we now lavish on library books” 
(Magnani, 2007, pp. 20-21). A sentiment more strongly represented by Martin Luther King, Jr.: 
I am aware that there are many who wince at a distinction between property and 
persons – who hold both sacrosanct. My views are not so rigid. A life is sacred. 
Property is intended to serve life, and no matter how much we surround it with 
rights and respect, it has no personal being. It is part of the earth man walks on; it 
is not man (King, 2011, p. 58). 
Things, property, technologies and narratives serve the living. That is their purpose, as given in 
their origins as construals and employment as moral mediators. Reminding persons of this fact is 
the rationale behind crafting the claim that we must respect persons (at least as well) as things. 
There is certainly nothing controversial here. 
 Rather, what is controversial is admitting that things are valued above living, breathing 
human beings. For instance, in war, immoral treatment seems justifiable, with the value of life 
relative things like “oil” and “economy” turned upside-down: 
Wars compel cultures to acknowledge that they attribute greater value and respect 
to tanks and technological weapons (and the all-encompassing commodification 
of human needs) than to an intact natural community of living plants, animals, 
and human beings (Magnani, 2011, p. 232). 
As we have seen, people tend to insulate themselves from such uncomfortable realizations, 
embubbled in justificatory language like “Axis of Evil” and narratives like “they hate us for our 
freedom.” “War violently kills human beings, and this fact is too horrific for some people to 
accept when faced with it”, so they maintain their ignorance by “building an emotional firewall” 
behind which they “regress into a sort of psychological refuge from the horrors of war”, thereby 
keeping war “out there” (Magnani, 2011, p. 232). For direct agents of war, soldiers and 
mercenaries, this process is also aided by recent advances in technology, such as remotely 
controlled missile carriers which insulate the killer/operator from her/his violence behind a 
computer monitor within an air conditioned concrete bunker, “death by joystick”. Magnani 
analyzes this condition in terms of “bad faith”, wherein people dislocate the source of valuation 
from selves to some realm of ideals, valuing themselves in terms of narrative roles to which they 
give themselves over, for example transforming good democratic citizenship into blind support 
of the military and its dependent corporations or transforming military valor from courage under 
fire to faithful disregard for “collateral damage”, thus insulating themselves from criticism, “and 
more importantly, from responsibility for actions undertaken as that role”, by creating “a safe 
external entity that cannot participate in their own identity”(Magnani, 2007, p. 136). After an 
afternoon of air-conditioned murder, the killer/operator in the above example simply jumps into 
her/his SUV and goes home, an exercise in bad faith only possible through recent technological 
advances. Thus, aided by technology, persons make bubbles of themselves, become things, and 
so, rather than actively constructive homines poietici, become “mere objects of their own 
evaluation”. 
 Consider in this light the ubiquitous distinction between public and private life whereby a 
person does things at work that he might not do otherwise. Classic examples include the 
politician war-criminal claiming that “everything we did was legal”, and the foot-soldier that he 
was “only following orders”. Contrast this with that example of a person who does what he loves 
to do, and fulfills that role as a life of art and practice. Socrates, for example, famously went 
home rather than follow orders to arrest a man on trumped up charges so that his wealth might be 
seized, and the man executed. In the latter case, this person is not his role, but rather the role is 
himself. He is doing what needs to be done, and in this way is a means to others’ happiness, to 
their ends. However, there is no bad faith. He has not made a bubble of himself, but rather 
refused to enter one with others. Thus, we may fully grasp the respect due to human beings as 
things, because, as this example illustrates, the thing - a role, job, office, etcetera - is itself a 
human being, and can only ever be a human being. “If we fail to associate external things’ 
positive qualities with the person, if we do not ‘respect’ the human being as a means/thing, then 
we do not recognize that instrumental condition as incorporating ends in itself” (Magnani, 2007, 
p. 136). Indeed, respecting people as things is a moral necessity. 
 The “instrumental condition” is simply the fact that human beings are able to act towards 
the realization of constructive projects, create order. Where this inherent potential is leveled to 
the potential of any valuable thing, like a library book perhaps valuable but essentially not able 
to act in the realization of constructive goals, then the value of work is lost. The value of work 
does not reside in the product, but in the realization of the self as the work is done. One’s self is 
one’s own greatest life’s work. Also the most difficult. Perhaps this is why so many prefer to live 
in bad faith, while others fail due to what Kant calls weakness of will, “To will is present with 
me, but how to perform I find not”, ultimately the failure to gain the knowledge necessary to do 
the job that needs to be done, and why Magnani maintains that “appropriate ethical knowledge 
and proper moral reasoning are the basic conditions for maintaining freedom and taking 
responsibility for our actions”, the foundations of moral life and ultimately why he holds that 
knowledge is a duty, especially the self-knowledge to overcome “the lack of knowledge” due to 
bad faith that exists as “a blind spot in one’s knowledge of oneself” (Kant, 1898, p. 217, 
Magnani, 2007, pp. 221 and 249). This is also why models of self-construction are so important, 
to serve as technological ego- and ecopoietic mediators in the crucial yet difficult task of 
becoming “good” persons, perhaps even rendering the solution transparent. 
 In this direction, Luciano Floridi extends his “3C model”, suggesting that it accounts for 
the deepest difficulties in reasoning about the self, namely that a self is experienced as one self 
over time, perduring through changes, retaining integrity, and is capable of self-reflection 
whereby it becomes an object of self-evaluation. The 3C model grounds the emergence of selves 
in corporeal processing (chemical), from which arises cognitive (sentience, awareness), and 
finally conscious processing (self-awareness). Each sphere of processing supervenes on the last, 
delimited by “membranes”, as “the self emerges as a break with nature”: 
Each membrane, and hence each step in the detachment of the individual from the 
world, is made possible by a specific, auto-reinforcing, bonding force. The 
corporeal membrane relies on chemical bonds and orientations. The cognitive 
membrane relies on the bonds and orientations provided by what is known in 
information theory as mutual information, that is the (measure of) the 
interdependence of data (the textbook example is the mutual dependence between 
smoke and fire). And, finally, the consciousness membrane relies on the bonds 
and orientations provided by semantics (here narratives provide plenty of 
examples), which ultimately makes possible a stable and long-lasting detachment 
from reality. At each stage, corporeal, cognitive and consciousness elements fit 
together in structures (body, cognition, mind) that owe their unity and 
coordination to such bonding forces. The more virtual the structure becomes, the 
more it is disengaged from the external environment in favor of an autonomously 
constructed world of meanings and interpretations, the less physical and more 
virtual the bonding force can be (Floridi, 2011b, p. 560). 
Crucially, in light of preceding discussion, though “each membrane contributes to the 
construction of the self”, “inextricably mixed together to give rise to a self and its personal 
identity”, 
[…] this truism hides the fundamental fact that, once a membrane is in place, the 
particular inside that it detaches from the relevant outside becomes conceivably 
independent of the previous stages of development. It is correct to stress that there 
is no butterfly without the caterpillar, but insisting that once the butterfly is born 
the caterpillar must still be there for the butterfly to live and flourish is a 
conceptual confusion. There is no development of the self without the corporeal 
and the cognitive faculties, but once the latter have given rise to a consciousness 
membrane, the life of the self may be entirely internal and independent of the 
specific body and faculties that made it possible. While in the air, you no longer 
need the springboard, even if it was the springboard that allowed you to jump so 
high, and your airborne time is limited by gravity  (Floridi, 2011b, p. 561). 
Floridi is describing nothing less than self-embubblement in fairy tales, to which we may 
respond in like terms. Certainly, the butterfly is no longer a caterpillar in our eyes, but doesn’t a 
single thread of physical information underwrite both entities? Certainly, airborne we forget the 
springboard, but failing to recall our origins in that weightless instant in the end transforms us 
only into a tragic mess in the dirt, anagnorisis. We can also certainly allow that the 
“consciousness membrane relies on the bonds and orientations provided by semantics”, of which 
narratives are prime examples, but, morally speaking, do we really want our moral fables to 
encourage “a stable and long-lasting detachment from reality?” Where there is smoke there is 
(often) fire, but this is not for the sake of a message. It is simply a fact of matter. 
4. Non-violent Transformation of Self and World 
“Very well,” replied Ivan, “you need not become soldiers unless you wish to.” 
     - Leo Tolstoy, Ivan the Fool17 
 
 Floridi’s approach invites a slippery slope dislocation of valuation hardly “suited to our 
realities as informational agents and patients” and hardly providing for “responsible stewardship 
in the world.” Moreover, to forge an ethics on the disengagement “from the external environment 
in favor of an autonomously constructed world of meanings and interpretations” is only to 
proliferate bubbles. Disorder. We have seen how such a move is spontaneous, and why it may 
even seem appealing, entropically embodied as we are, but fairy tale happy endings exist, sadly, 
only in fairy tales, and ultimately, all returns to ground. 
  We are left with anagnorisis - which is to require that one first create a bubble of 
himself, only then have it unexpectedly popped, an experience perhaps fruitful but better off 
avoided - or Magnani’s approach, creative abduction engaged with the world and with a “well 
fed mind”, wary of embubblement. In the latter spirit, in my own work, I have developed the 
ACTWith model, inspired equally by bottom-up hybrid neural network models, 
complex/dynamic systems, traditional moral philosophy, and neurology – especially social 
cognitive neuroscience, empathy and mirroring (White, 2006, 2010, in press, forthcoming). 
Space forbids complete exposition, but it is detailed in other vehicles, so here will note only 
those ways in which the ACTWith (As-if Coming-to-Terms-With) approach, representing the 
bare minimum moral architecture, mediates self-poiesis sans tragedy. It is a situated, embodied 
and embedded information processing framework composed of a four-fold cycle - As-if (closed) 
coming-to-terms-with (closed); As-if (open) coming-to-terms-with (closed); As-if (closed) 
coming-to-terms-with (open); and As-if (open) coming-to-terms-with (open) - with the open “as-
if” operations feeling a situation out, and the open “coming-to-terms-with” operations defining 
the situation accordingly, an affect-first self-as-future-conditional model of agency retaining 
practical wisdom as its limiting condition. As in Floridi’s model, integrity is ultimately a matter 
of embodiment. But, two important differences bear highlighting in the present context. First, in 
order to properly evaluate mirrored/empathized information, information is fundamentally 
understood in natural energetic/metabolic terms. Second, these ontic grounds discourage 
embubblement and encourage “conscientiousness”, habitual openness to self and others, as 
information crucial for solving life’s most difficult problems (for example, the ego- and 
ecopoietic problems reviewed throughout this paper) is most efficiently collected thereby, and 
having done so, the risk of hamartia is reduced. Tragedy avoided.18 Representing the essential, 
embodied social nature of moral cognition, emphasizing the guiding resource that is shared 
experience, the ACTWith model both reinforces the threads of moral philosophical tradition that 
bind ancient tradition with cutting-edge science and technology, and extends this technology in 
an accessible form for active self-construction. It does so by extending a pattern of information 
processing essential to moral cognition, and as agents match this pattern, it serves as a 
technological mediator of self-poiesis, thereby rendering moral solutions transparent.  Thus, 
facilitating the non-violent constructive transformation of self, the ACTWith model is an 
example of ICTs “significantly affecting who we are, who we think we are, who we might 
become, and who we think we might become.” 
 But, what of naratives in light of which each one of us makes sense of it all? As we have 
seen, narratives represent the ordered spaces of information in terms of which one lives, dies, 
succeeds or fails, and so provide crucial support in the realization of personal identity. 
We usually see our own lives and those of others as a series of narratives, and we 
‘‘continually reinterpret and revise our narrative self-understanding’’. For 
example, we scroll through our cache of stories to find one that can best clarify 
the moral problem at hand and that we can reconcile with our self-representations 
and ideals (Magnani, 2007, pp. 177-178). 
Our final problem is to find a narrative mediator for moral self-construction so that, fully 
informed of this potential, we can best determine our characters, good or evil. Scrolling through 
the cache of stories reviewed so far, we have already glimpsed such a narrative, in the illustration 
of a universal plane of moral order representing a low-energy stable state of maximal potential 
energy. 
 This picture is inspired by the narrative in terms of which Socrates makes sense of his 
environment, of himself in it, and of his interactions with and within it. In the Gorgias, Socrates 
maintains that language should be used to get rid of injustice (Plato, 1987, 480d) rather than to 
“scheme” for selfish enrichment at the expense of others,(481b), that bad leaders use language in 
the former mode, making people evil and encouraging bubbles, while good leaders in the latter 
even if it means telling people what they don’t want to hear, (503a-) Callicles – an upstart 
politician of the former mode - poignantly objects “won’t this human life of ours be turned 
upside down, and won’t everything we do evidently be the opposite of what we should 
do?”(481c) Socrates affirms this, noting that Callicles is in a state of internal “dissonance”, bad 
faith, pretending it just to do injustice (482a-c). Callicles denies this, maintaining that it is natural 
for the more powerful to take from the less powerful (483d), and, foreshadowing the most tragic 
instance of affirming the consequent in the history of future-conditionals, that only a “slave” 
(prisoner) would not do similarly if able, “one who is better dead than alive” (483a,b). Socrates 
then forces Callicles to confess that doing for one’s self at the expense of others is unnatural, but 
that fairness is, and that we ought to be fair (488e-489a), thereby popping his moral bubble. At 
this perceived violence, Callicles notes that Socrates lives outside of the reigning moral bubble 
of political opinion, issuing the veiled threat that some evil man might drag him back in to be 
judged in those embubbled terms (521c), to be imprisoned by those terms, with Socrates 
expecting that, as he aims for what is best rather than making people happy (521e), “it wouldn’t 
be all that strange if I were put to death” (521d). Finally, Socrates recounts the fable that brought 
him to this position. This fable establishes a beacon at the endpoint of life, a plane of moral 
judgement marked by the necessary three points for a geometric plane, represented as judges, 
from which two roads proceed, one down, to tragedy and anagnorisis, and one up (524a). On 
that field, all are judged outside of their moral bubbles according to evidence of their moral lives, 
whether seriously “warped” from life in a selfishly confined moral bubble, or “straight” from a 
life on a level plane of universal moral law, terms by which Socrates feels he will be judged 
favorably. 
 Socrates’ chosen fable helps him become “the most just man in Athens” in “a stable and 
long-lasting detachment” from the political reality of bad faith because it sets out the terms from 
which he acts, to which he aims, and ultimately for which he dies, thus serving as a mediator of 
moral self-construction ensuring against hamartia and anagnorisis. Living as if on a level plane 
of justice, Socrates remains an inhabitant of the ethosphere writ large, resisting embubblement 
through work, philosophy, and thereby providing through fairy-tale example the support we need 
to effect the nonviolent transformation of the world. He does effectively affirm the consequent of 
his life as a future conditional. But, don’t we all? And, if this is our greatest moral sin, it is also 
that which makes us most worthy. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
One’s self is one’s most important life’s work, but it is also the most difficult. In no small part 
this is due to the importance of the product, nothing less than one’s only self. Working with the 
right information, towards the right ends, aided by technology, the product of a life’s work is a 
just human being. This is a life worth living. Poorly informed and misdirected, one may suffer a 
tragic irony, to have acted with best intentions only become a very bad person, for it is truly 
terrible when one judges his entire life wrong. Moreover, as the world we build is as well the 
product of our actions, actions the effects of which are amplified by technologies designed to 
carry our intentions, to act on bad information is to risk a tragic end for not only one life, but for 
us all and everyone yet to come. Should we have no desire to suffer twice, both in our personal 
realities as well as in retrospect, looking back on the wreck made of the Earth through lifetimes 
of collective bad action, tools for the non-violent transformation of self and world must be our 
highest priority.  
The conceptual tools necessary to effect constructive change to moral ends of both self 
and world was this paper’s central focus. We began by briefly reviewing Luciano Floridi’s 
information ethics. Four interconnected issues, arose – self-determination, moral valuation, 
entropy and narrative. We found that Floridi misplaces the source of moral valuation away from 
human beings, that the entropic base of his principled ethics is inconsistent in both assertion and 
application, and that his appointed pattern for effective self-realization is a path not only 
avoidable, but better off avoided. Granted that self, world, and their revolutions are best 
understood informationally, we found resources to understand Floridi’s “infosphere” as an 
“ethosphere” in Lorenzo Magnani’s cognitive niches, and tools to effect the transformation of 
infosphere to ethosphere in his moral mediators. With these came an understanding of human 
beings as entropically grounded creators of order whose fundamental tool (and weapon) in the 
creation and maintenance of said orders is the prototypical ICT, language. Through Magnani’s 
work in moral bubbles and inisights into non-violent social change, we came to realize the power 
of myth to shape our lives, as well as our active role in the creation, maintenance, and 
reformation of said myths, their limits, and the ends to which they bring us. Finally, then, we 
were able to see how Floridi’s 3C model fails to adequately represent moral self-development in 
a way that serves to mediate moral self-determination in actual moral subjects. In the last section, 
we briefly reviewed a model of moral cognition that does not suffer the shortcomings of the 3C 
model, and took a fresh look at an old fable, one which, when freely chosen, sets terms to shape 
a moral life into a just man. With a just world in sight, we must only get there. 
Though we have the capacity to construct our own selves, our world, and the myths in 
light of which self and world all make sense, choosing the right story, and living accordingly, is a 
most difficult task. Luckily, we have the resources in moral philosophers, moral exemplars, and 
their guiding narratives with which to begin, and are gifted with the technological accumen to 
design the tools to get this most important work done.  Hopefully, the preceding paper helps to 
set us on the right path in both efforts. In the end, what we do at this point, fully informed of 
possibilities and fully capable of realizing them, will determine who we become, good or evil. 
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